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Applying for Entitlements: Employers and the Targeted Jobs 
Tax Credit 
John H. Bishop and Suk Kang 
Abstract 
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) is probably the most outstanding example of a 
generous entitlement program with a very low participation rate. Only about 10 percent 
of eligible youth hired are claimed as a tax credit by their employers. The causes of the 
low participation rates are analyzed by estimating a Poisson model of the number of 
TJTC-eligibles hired and certified during 1980, 1981, and 1982. Information costs, both 
fixed and variable, are found to be key barriers to TJTC participation. The cost-
effectiveness of TJTC is low because of the stigma attached and the very high recruitment 
costs of hiring additional TJTC-eligibles. Because employers find it relatively cheap to 
certify after the fact eligible new employees who would have been hired anyway, this 
passive mode of participating in TJTC predominates. 
Policy analysts are most influential when they become involved early in the 
policy planning process-before a program begins and before special interest groups have 
sprung up around it. At this stage the analyst is not evaluating existing policies or 
programs but rather predicting the consequences of hypothetical situations. The role of 
prospective analysis is especially critical for tax credit and entitlement schemes that are 
designed to change behavior. The effects of a policy are always hard to predict, but with 
entitlements it is even difficult to predict costs. Furthermore, the effects of an entitlement 
are not revealed by putting it into operation. When everyone in a particular group is 
eligible for a subsidy or tax credit, problems of selection bias increase the difficulty of 
making valid impact evaluations. Prospective policy analysis requires two things: a 
theory (or a simplified representation of the key behavioral relationships), and knowledge 
of the magnitude of key behavioral parameters. A common approach is to estimate the 
relevant price and income elasticities, and then calculate the effects of the prices and 
income produced by the subsidy [Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Bishop and Lerman, 1977; 
Hammermesh, 1978; Hammermesh and Grant, 1979]. What generally goes unrecognized 
(at least formally) in these exercises is that costs of administering, learning about, 
applying for, and responding to these grants and subsidy payments are quite significant 
and that these costs have major effects on the scale and impact of the program. 
Behavioral parameters estimated from observed responses to wage-rate differentials can-
not, for instance, be applied willy-nilly to simulate the effect of a tax credit for expanding 
employment, such as the New Jobs Tax Credit of 1977/78. 
A common finding of policy simulation studies is that elasticities of response to a 
subsidy or tax credit are greatest when the object of subsidy is narrowly defined. Even 
though costs decline proportionately with the size of the target, the relevant elasticities of 
substitution typically rise as the target is more narrowly defined. Often, the resulting 
policy recommendation is to target the scheme as narrowly as possible [Bassi, 1986]. 
This ignores the fact that many of the costs of administering and participating in a 
subsidy or grant program are fixed. They do not vary appreciably with the size of the 
individual grant or tax credit, and they vary less than proportionately with the number of 
participants in the program. If a program is too small and too targeted, the costs of 
learning about it may be larger than the expected benefits of participation. Few targeted 
individuals and firms will participate, and the administrative costs may outweigh the 
social benefits. 
Another danger of targeting is that members of the target group may be 
stigmatized. Target group members who were in the past incognito may now be publicly 
identified. When told that government is offering to subsidize the hiring of person A, 
employers may become suspicious of person A's competence or reliability [Bishop, 
1989]. 
The theory and empirical analysis that inform prospective policy analysis cannot, 
then, be limited to the standard income and substitution parameters of production and 
utility theory. An understanding of the administrative and information costs involved in 
running and participating in the program must also be included. Policy analysts need a 
body of literature on these issues: one that explains what happened five years ago when 
program X was implemented, and that can aid in predicting the information costs and 
participation response to subsidy schemes that are under consideration. 
This paper examines the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), perhaps the most 
outstanding example of an entitlement program with extremely low participation rates 
despite a very generous subsidy offer. Between 1979 and 1985, firms that hired certain 
disadvantaged individuals were eligible for a tax credit equal to one-half of the first 
$6000 of wages paid in the first year of employment and one-fourth of such wages in the 
second year. The eligible target groups were handicapped individuals, welfare recipients 
and economically disadvantaged youth, Vietnam veterans, and ex-offenders. Between 
1981 and 1985, the number of targeted individuals who were hired and determined to be 
eligible (certified) ranged between 200,000 and 586,000 annually. Large as these 
numbers may seem, they represent only a small fraction of the total number of eligible 
individuals hired during this period. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that 
TJTC helped less than 10 percent of the eligible young people who were hired during 
1983 [Christensen, 1984]. Furthermore, the companies that participated in TJTC in 1982 
accounted for only about 4 percent of the nation's employers and less than 20 percent of 
the nation's jobs. In a 1982 survey, 73 percent of the employers who had some familiarity 
with the program said they did not plan to ask for TJTC-eligible referrals when they 
needed unskilled workers in the future. 
Low take-up rates for targeted hiring subsidies are not a uniquely American 
phenomenon; European efforts to subsidize the employment of particular target groups 
have also had low participation rates [Schmid, 1981]. Similarly low take-up rates have 
occurred for other tax subsidies. For example, the 1954 income tax code revision allowed 
firms to use accelerated depreciation schedules on all new investment, but six years later 
only 21 percent of all proprietorships and 30 percent of all corporations were using an 
accelerated depreciation method on any component of their capital stock [Ture, 1967]. 
What happened with TJTC? Why did employers turn such a cold shoulder on 
such a generous subsidy? Clearly, the expected costs of learning about and participating 
in this program must, for most firms, have been larger than the expected benefits. What 
are these costs? Has TJTC's highly targeted nature, as Bishop and Haveman [1979] 
suggested, stigmatized the workers it was designed to help? What implications do high 
nonpecuniary costs of participation and the resulting low participation rates have for the 
policy analysis of programs, like TJTC, that subsidize activities considered to be in the 
public interest-such as hiring the disadvantaged, or increasing R & D spending? These 
are the questions this paper addresses. 
The first section that follows develops a very simple Poisson representation of 
employer participation in TJTC. The extent of participation is analyzed as it relates to the 
expected tax benefits as weighed against the fixed and variable costs of learning about 
and participating in the program. This model generates a number of predictions about 
which employers will be the heaviest users of TJTC and how these patterns will change 
over time. The next sections present the results of data analysis from a large-scale 
employer survey on the use of TJTC, and examine whether most of the employers 
participating in the program are active users who try to increase their hiring of eligibles, 
or passive users who seek tax credits for people they would have hired even without the 
program. The paper then explores how the stigma issue relates to the use and the effects 
of the program. A summary section recounts the empirical findings, discusses some 
options for reforming TJTC, and draws some conclusions about how prospective policy 
analysis should proceed in the future. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Bishop [1982], Ashenfelter [1983], and Moffitt [1983] have shown that the low 
participation rates in many income maintenance programs can be explained by models in 
which participation stigmatizes the individual or entails other significant nonpecuniary 
costs. On the surface it might appear that decisions to participate in the Targeted Jobs Tax 
Credit are very different from decisions to participate in income tested transfer programs. 
Since employers make the participation decisions, factor demand theory rather than 
utility theory is relevant. In TJTC, the person who decides whether to participate and who 
receives the subsidy is not stigmatized by participation; rather the stigma falls on the 
eligible job applicants. The potential tax credit is very much larger than the payment a 
poor family can receive from welfare, so incentives to learn about the program would 
appear to be stronger. Nevertheless, nonpecuniary costs of participation are the primary 
reason for low participation rates. While such costs arise for different reasons, their 
structure is rather similar to that assumed by Moffitt's [1983] analysis of welfare 
participation. In both cases, nonpecuniary costs depend on both the fact and the extent of 
participation; and in both cases, a change in the decision maker's behavior can increase 
the subsidy received. As a result, the costs of TJTC participation affect employer 
behavior-lowering participation rates and reducing incentive effects - in much the same 
way that stigma affected individual behavior in Moffitt's analysis of welfare. We will 
return to these similarities in a later section. 
The nonpecuniary costs of participating in TJTC derive largely from the fact that 
it subsidizes the hiring of workers who are both hard to identify and generally thought to 
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Figure 1. Costs and benefits for the passive participant in TJTC. 
be below average in productivity. Because the targeting criteria involve family income 
and receipt of welfare, the government must come in to certify whether each individual is 
eligible. Even if the firm has already hired people who are TJTC-eligible, participation 
has its costs: The employer must learn about the program, establish a relationship with 
the administering agency, and apply for certification of those new hires thought to be 
eligible. Since September 1981, employers have been required to apply for certification 
prior to the new hire's first day of work. The costs of passive participation-obtaining tax 
credits without changing the number of eligibles hired-are both fixed (Cp) and variable 
(cp per eligible certified). Assuming homothetic technology and no TJTC-induced change 
in the rate of turn-over of targeted labor (t), in the exogenous growth rate of the 
establishment (go), and in who is hired, passive participation is preferable to 
nonparticipation if: 
Net Benefitsp = NBp = (SW - cp)(go + t)To - Cp > O (1) 
where S is the rate of subsidy (0 if the firm has no tax liability), W is the wage of target 
group labor and To is the number of eligible workers employed in the base period. The 
case of the passive user of the TJTC program with stable employment (go = 0) is 
illustrated by Figure 1. The subsidy payment made to the company is the crosshatched 
area, and the variable cost of obtaining tax credits is the area BCFE. The net benefits of 
passive participation are shown by the area AA'EB minus Cp. 
The objectives of TJTC are realized only if firms are actively responding to the 
subsidy incentive by increasing their hiring of targeted workers. At first glance, it might 
seem always advantageous for a participating firm to increase hiring of eligibles. This is 
not necessarily the case, however, because active participation is more costly than passive 
participation, and these additional costs may outweigh the additional tax credits that can 
be obtained by purposely expanding the hiring of eligibles. Many employers believe that 
TJTC-eligibles are less productive than other job applicants [Bishop and Hollenbeck, 
1986]. Prior to TJTC, asking job applicants whether they were welfare recipients or 
disadvantaged was generally thought to be illegal, so people from stigmatized groups 
typically obtained jobs without the employer learning of their disadvantaged status. Even 
with the help of TJTC, many disadvantaged job seekers believe, probably correctly, that 
revealing their disadvantaged status will reduce their chances of being hired [Burtless, 
1985; Moran et al., 1982]. If only a minority of eligibles are aware of their eligibility or 
willing to reveal it, finding additional TJTC-eligibles who come close to meeting the 
firm's hiring criteria becomes very expensive. Thus, trying to hire additional TJTC-
eligibles may generate delays in filling openings and result in a higher proportion of the 
new hires performing poorly on the job. These variable costs of active participation are 
assumed to be a constant amount (ca) per additional eligible hired. In Figures 1 and 2 the 
magnitude of the variable costs of active participation is indicated by line segment DE. In 
Figure 1 these costs are so high, the firm chooses not to reorient its hiring practices so as 
to increase the number of eligibles hired. In Figure 2 the variable costs of active 
participation are lower, so the firm responds to the subsidy program by increasing the 
hiring of eligibles. 
The additional costs of active participation are also to some degree fixed (Ca), 
because an increase in the hiring of eligibles necessitates a shift of recruitment efforts to 
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Figure 2. Costs and benefits for the aggressive participant in TJTC. 
labor market intermediaries that can refer eligibles and/or the development of a 
mechanism for screening all job applicants (not just those hired, as in passive 
participation) for eligibility. For firms that are active participants in TJTC, the growth of 
eligible employees at the firm becomes endogenous. Whether a firm will choose active 
participation over nonparticipation can be judged by comparing the profits obtainable at 
the effective post-subsidy wage of (1 - S)W+ cp + ca (after subtracting participation costs 
and the subsidy on the previously employed workers) to the profits obtainable if the firm 
does not participate [Ashenfelter, 1978; Montgomery, 1982].1 Letting % be the profit 
function and P be the vector of all other prices, the net benefits to active participation, 
NBa, can be expressed as: 
NBa = n(P,(l- S)W + cp + ca) - n(P,W) - Cp - Ca (2) 
- (SW- cp - ca)(I - t)T0 + ca(t + g0)T0 
The second term gives the firm's profit, assuming no effort is made to claim a TJTC tax 
credit. The first term of the equation is the profit function evaluated for a wage, (1 - S)W 
+ cp + ca), that is net of both subsidy benefits and variable participation costs. Since the 
subsidy is for recruitment of new employees, no subsidy is received for eligibles hired in 
the past, (1 - t)To. The fifth term makes the subtraction necessary to account for this fact 
and gives the area in Figure 2 of WAD'D". The final term of equation (2) is the 
mathematical expression for the area D'DEB, the marginal cost of active participation 
times the number of eligible new hires that would have been claimed if the subsidy had 
not induced any increase in the hiring of eligibles. 
The firm participates if either (1) or (2) is positive. If (1) is larger than (2), the 
number of targeted workers certified is (t + g0)T0 and the employer does not increase the 
hiring of eligibles and is thus termed a passive participant. This case is illustrated by 
Figure 1, where cp = line segment BC and ca = line segment DE. Otherwise, the number 
of targeted workers certified comes from maximizing (2), and the employer increases 
hiring of eligibles and is thus termed an active participant. This case is illustrated by 
Figure 2. 
Hypotheses to be Tested 
The theory just sketched suggests a number of testable hypotheses about which 
firms are most likely to participate in TJTC. Obviously a firm is more likely to be a heavy 
user of the program if it has many job openings for unskilled workers. Consequently, the 
following indicators of the potential scale of hiring of unskilled workers by the sampled 
establishment are hypothesized to have positive effects on TJTC use: 
• Total employment at the establishment times the proportion of the work force 
in low-skill occupations (T0). 
1
 Note that it has been implicitly assumed that the firm is constrained from firing all of the low-skill 
workers currently employed and replacing them with subsidized new hires. Most firms are at least partly 
constrained from simply firing workers without apparent cause. This assumption is reasonable because the 
training costs for new workers often exceed the magnitude of the subsidy, and because there have been as 
yet no documented cases of experienced workers being fired to hire a subsidy-eligible worker. 
• The growth rate of employment at that establishment (go). 
• The rate of turnover of unskilled workers (t ). 
• The elasticity of demand for unskilled labor. 
Firms that have shown a willingness to hire and train unskilled workers in the past 
face lower incremental costs of active participation (ca) than other firms. This increases 
the probability and amount of participation, so the following characteristics are 
hypothesized to raise the likelihood of participation: 
• Being a nonunion firm with flexibility in terminating unwanted workers. 
Employers feel that hiring a subsidized worker increases the risk that 
things will not work out. If the firm can easily correct a hiring mistake by 
firing the worker, the costs of mistakes are reduced. 
• Having on-the-job training (OJT) that is general rather than specific. The 
turnover rates of TJTC eligibles are believed to be higher than for other 
competing workers. If OJT is extensive and specific to the firm, these 
higher rates of turnover will impose significant costs on the firm and raise 
the marginal cost of participation. If training is general and workers pay 
for the training, higher turnover rates will not be a serious problem. 
• Having below-average starting wage rates. The marginal costs of 
participation will be lower because the firm will already be accustomed to 
providing the additional training that TJTC eligibles might require. 
• Having been contacted by Employment Service officials offering to refer 
TJTC-eligibles. 
• Having used the Employment Service in the past. 
Only one indicator of the incremental costs of passive participation (cp) is in the data set: 
• Having a high proportion of workers who are full-time. Marginal participation 
costs are the same for each worker, regardless of the numbers of hours 
worked. The subsidy is typically larger for full-time workers. Consequently, 
the difference between subsidy and marginal participation costs is greater for 
full-time workers, and incentives are stronger both to apply for certifications 
(passive participation) and to recruit additional eligibles (active participation). 
Since lower fixed costs of participation (Cp and Ca) raise the probability of participation, 
the following types of employers are hypothesized to be more likely to participate in 
TJTC: 
• Establishments that are part of a large multi-establishment firm. Such firms 
spread the fixed costs of learning how to use the program and revising 
internal administrative procedures over many establishments. All other 
scale variables refer to the establishment, not the firm. 
• Establishments that have personnel directors. Personnel directors have more 
time to learn about programs like TJTC than owners or plant managers, 
and they are also more likely to be targeted for outreach by agencies 
seeking to place TJTC-eligibles. 
• Members of local business organizations. These employers are more likely to 
get a "sales pitch" about TJTC at meetings or in a newsletter. 
• Employers contacted by local program administrators. 
• Employers that have participated in this or similar programs in the past. 
Participation in one program teaches the firm how to handle the paper-
work and generates contacts that facilitate future use of TJTC. A firm's 
experience with eligible workers may also result in more favorable atti-
tudes towards them. A variable for past participation may also pick up the 
effects of unobserved heterogeneity. 
• Employers with a positive attitude toward government. 
• Regular users of the employment service. 
Participation is defined as the number of target group members hired and 
certified. In the sample of establishments studied, about 90 percent did not hire and 
certify any TJTC worker, 5 percent hired and certified 1 to 5 workers, and the remaining 
5 percent hired and certified more than 6 workers. Because of the highly skewed and 
discrete nature of the distribution, the Poisson specification proposed by Hausman, Hall, 
and Griliches [1984] is employed. The model is specified in terms of the establishment's 
probability of hiring and certifying zero, one, two, . . . TJTC workers. The Poisson 
distribution gives the probability of nonnegative integer outcomes. The probability func-
tion is given by the following formula: 
Pr(Ni) = exp(-mi) miN/Ni! (m, > O, Ni = 0,1,2 . . .) (3) 
where (mi > 0, N =0,1,2 . . .) 
For instance, the probabilities of hiring zero, one, and two TJTC workers are given by: 
Pr(0) = exp(- mi) 
Pr(1) = exp(- mi) mi 
Pr(2) = exp(- mi) mi2/2 
The parameter mi is assumed to be specific to the ith employer and is determined 
by the employer's characteristics. Specifically it is assumed that mi is determined by the 
following formula: 
log mi = XiB (4) 
Xi is a vector of the variables representing the ith employer's characteristics and B 
is a vector of coefficients. One of the very attractive features of the Poisson specification 
is that the partial derivative of mi with respect to the jth explanatory variable, Xij, is 
ami/Bij = dE(Ni)/dXij = bj exp(XB) = bjE(Ni) (5) 
where E is the expectation operator and E(Ni) is the expected number of TJTC 
certifications for the ith employer. Consequently, when X variables are logs, the b j 
coefficients are elasticities of TJTC use. When X variables are categorical or range 
between zero and one, bj measures the proportionate response of TJTC certification to the 
jth characteristic. Estimates of B are obtained by maximizing the log likelihood function 
which is written as, 
L(B) =Σ (-log Ni! - exp(XiB) + NiXiB. (6) 
RESULTS 
This section presents the results of a multivariate analysis of the determinants of TJTC 
use. The database analyzed is a 1982 survey of 3,412 employers, designed by staff at the 
National Center for Research in Vocational Education and conducted by the Gallup 
Organization. This survey was a reinterview of respondents to the 1980 Employment 
Opportunity Pilot Projects employer survey. The original sample was a stratified random 
sample of establishments (with higher probabilities of selection for large establishments 
in low wage industries) paying unemployment insurance taxes in 10 pilot sites, and 18 
comparison sites selected for their similarity to the pilot sites. A complete description of 
the sample, the survey, and copies of all relevant questions are available in Bishop [1985] 
and Bishop and Hollenbeck [1986]. Models were estimated predicting the number of 
TJTC-eligibles hired and certified in 1980, 1981, and 1982. The definition, means, and 
standard deviations of the variables used in the models are presented in Appendix Table 1 
(which can be obtained from the authors). The explanatory variables have been classified 
into these categories: indicators of the number of job openings at the establishment that 
could potentially be filled by eligibles; characteristics of the employer that relate to the 
fixed and variable costs of obtaining certifications; measures of government effort to 
encourage firms to hire TJTC workers; and the firms' past experience with government-
sponsored employment subsidy programs. Except for the variables that pertain to the 
previous experience with TJTC, we do not have yearly observations on the right hand 
side variables. 
The model was estimated separately for each of the three years in order to capture 
how the employer response to the TJTC program changed over time. Changes in 
employer response to the program are to be anticipated because (1) the program was new 
in 1979 and many of the employers learned of the program after 1980; (2) response to the 
program evolves over time as the firm becomes more familiar with the required 
paperwork and how to recruit and train members of the target groups; (3) the rules of the 
program changed significantly in 1981; and (4) efforts of local administrators to promote 
the program changed over time. The estimation results are presented in Table 1. 
Indicators of the Number of Job Openings That May Be Filled by Eligibles 
The indicators of the number of unskilled job openings during the year included in the 
regression are the log of establishment employment in 1980, the new hire rate in the 
Table 1. Determinants of TJTC hiring. (Number of observations = 2,621) 
Variables 
Indicators of the number 
Log estab. empl. 
in 1980 
New hire rate in 
1979: IV 
Proportion under 25 
in 1979 
Proportion unskilled 
in 1979 
1980 
of eligibles 
0.761c 
1.101c 
-1.125 
0.266b 
(26.9) 
(3.10) 
(.65) 
(2.17) 
Indicators of incremental participation cost 
Log index of general 
training 
Log index of specific 
training 
Unionized 
Proportion part-time 
Log cost of machine 
Wage residual 
Someone fired in 1979 
Layoff based on 
seniority 
Indicators of fixed cost 
Log firm/estab. 
employment 
Has personnel office 
Member of 
local business 
organization 
Listed opening with 
employment service 
in 1979 
Outreach 
Government office of 
eligibility referral 
Conversation about 
TJTC not initiated 
by firm 
Both a conversation 
and a referral offer 
.280c 
-.130a 
- .271 b 
-.237 
- .075c 
- .347c 
.144a 
.111 
-.071 
-.120 
.310c 
- .503c 
2.467c 
.626c 
- .937c 
Previous receipt of subsidies 
New jobs tax credit 
WIN in 1977, 78, 
or 79 
CETA-OJT in 78 or 79 
.376c 
.122 
.614c 
(7.49) 
(1.79) 
(2.37) 
(1.28) 
(3.86) 
(3.57) 
(1.83) 
(.98) 
(2.08) 
(1.43) 
(4.17) 
(6.92) 
(20.9) 
(3.74) 
(5.18) 
(4.31) 
(1.04) 
(6.23) 
1981 
.855c 
3.139c 
1.113c 
-1.95a 
.218c 
-.318c 
.409c 
- .284a 
-.103c 
.051 
.233c 
- .191 a 
.083c 
.201a 
.006 
-.167b 
1.58c 
.358c 
-1.019c 
.250c 
.064 
.891c 
(31.63) 
(11.48) 
(6.90) 
(1.70) 
(6.12) 
(4.71) 
(4.00) 
(1.73) 
(5.43) 
(.54) 
(3.09) 
(1.80) 
(3.26) 
(2.50) 
(.08) 
(2.49) 
(18.25) 
(3.00) 
(7.40) 
(2.97) 
(.63) 
(10.85) 
1982 
.462c 
3.606 
.702c 
1.468c 
-.106b 
-.084 
-1.040c 
.193 
.157c 
.162 
-.557c 
.322b 
364c 
.263c 
.146 
.467c 
2.204c 
.563c 
-1.222c 
.928c 
.290b 
1.092c 
i 
(12.65) 
(11.66) 
(3.48) 
(9.53) 
(2.04) 
(.90) 
(6.19) 
(1.13) 
(6.17) 
(1.22) 
(5.60) 
(2.23) 
(12.85) 
(2.29) 
(1.65) 
(4.78) 
(17.83) 
(3.06) 
(5.82) 
(8.62) 
(2.16) 
(9.06) 
?-value in parenthesis 
a
 Significant at the 10% level (two sided) 
b
 Significant at the 5% level (two sided) 
c
 Significant at the \% level (two sided) 
fourth quarter of 1979, the proportion of the workers under age 25 in 1979, and the 
proportion of unskilled workers in 1979. The 1979 values of these variables are used 
because later values have been found to be influenced by the extent of participation in the 
program [Bishop and Montgomery, 1987], and their inclusion in the model would 
probably cause simultaneous equations bias. 
Since the log of the ratio of firm and establishment employment is also included 
in the model, the pure effect of establishment size is the coefficient for establishment size 
minus the coefficient for log of the ratio of firm size to establishment size. The difference 
gives the elasticity of the number of certified workers with respect to establishment size 
while holding firm size constant. The elasticity estimates are 0.83 and 0.78 in 1980 and 
1981, but the estimate dropped to 0.10 in 1982. This drop in the effect of establishment 
size may have been a response to the recession and the changes in program rules - the end 
of eligibility for cooperative education students, and the requirement that applications for 
certification be made prior to the new hire's starting work-that occurred at the end of 
1981. 
The new-hire rate in the fourth quarter of 1979 had a large positive effect on 
TJTC use, as hypothesized. A one percentage point increase in the new hire rate was 
associated with a 1 percent increase in TJTC employment in 1980 and a more than 3 
percent increase in 1981 and 1982. The share of employees that were under age 25 in 
1979 had the hypothesized large positive effects on use of TJTC in 1981 and 1982 but 
inexplicably not in 1980. The proportion of the firm's jobs that were unskilled (i.e., in 
laborer, operative, or service occupations) also had the hypothesized positive effect on 
TJTC use in 1980 and 1982 but not in 1981. 
Indicators of the Incremental Cost of Active Participation 
The indicators of the low skill, low wages, and lack of job security that were 
hypothesized to be associated with low incremental costs of active participation and 
therefore with heavy use of TJTC did have the expected effects in 1980 and early 1981. 
The characteristics that appear to have in-creased TJTC use were 
• offering new employees more than the usual amount of general training, 
• offering new employees less than the usual amount of specific training, 
• having low capital investment per worker, 
• having lower than average wage rates, and 
• having fired someone in the fourth quarter of 1979. 
After September 1981, however, the pattern changed and the firm characteristics 
that appear to have resulted in heavier use of TJTC were 
• being nonunion, 
• having high capital investments per employee, and 
• not having fired someone in the fourth quarter of 1979. 
The results for the post-ERTA period support our hypotheses about unionization 
but contradict our hypotheses regarding the effect of the other indicators of participation 
costs. One can only speculate as to why indicators of incremental participation costs that 
had the predicted effects on utilization in 1980 and 1981 should no longer have such 
effects after the ERTA amendments went into effect. The ERTA amendments made two 
major changes in TJTC: The blanket eligibility of cooperative education students was 
ended, and retroactive certifications were abolished. The first change might very well 
have reduced the training content of the typical TJTC-subsidized job. Since cooperative 
education placements can be thought of as low-skilled workers being placed in and 
trained for medium-skilled jobs, another consequence of the decrease in the number of 
the cooperative education students getting TJTC certifications might have been a shift 
toward firms with predominantly unskilled jobs. This might explain the big increase 
between 1981 and 1982 in the response of TJTC hiring to the proportion of the firm's 
jobs that are unskilled. The 1982 recession might also be responsible. 
Indicators of Fixed Cost 
The results also provide support for the hypothesis that fixed costs are an 
important determinant of TJTC use and that the pattern of fixed costs has substantially 
changed. Being a member of a local business organization had a big effect on 
participation in 1980 but not in later years. Having a personnel office did not increase 
program use at first, but it became important in 1981 and 1982. Probably the most 
dramatic change has been the growth in the use of TJTC by multi-establishment firms. In 
1981, establishments that were part of a chain were less likely to use TJTC. This changed 
in 1981, and in 1982 the ratio of firm to establishment employment had become one of 
the most important determinants of TJTC use. We asked managers of 35 multi-
establishment firms about this in a survey conducted during 1985 [Hollenbeck, 1985]. 
They reported that local managers had at first been unaware of the program and reluctant 
to get involved in TJTC because the tax benefits did not get passed through to their 
establishment's profit and loss statement. In 1981 the corporate staff of many of these 
companies started to encourage their local managers to use TJTC and promoted its use by 
offering incentives to local managers for hiring TJTC-eligibles. Multi-establishment 
firms now account for most TJTC certifications. The size of the establishment is no 
longer a primary determinant of TJTC usage; instead, the primary determinants seem to 
now be turnover rate, proportion of unskilled or young workers, and the size of the firm 
(rather than the establishment). 
The impact of being a user of the employment service during 1979 on later use of 
TJTC changed dramatically between 1980 and 1982 as a result of the ERTA 
amendments. Government contacts about TJTC and offers of eligible referrals are 
positively associated with having listed job openings in 1979. Holding referral offers 
constant, listing with the employment service apparently reduced use of TJTC in 1980 
but increased it in 1982. This change is no doubt due to the abolition of retroactive 
certification and the resulting greater use of employment service referrals to identify 
TJTC-eligibles before hiring. Prior to September 1981, 18 percent of the TJTC workers 
known to be eligible when hired were recruited through the employment service. In the 
six months following that date, 28.5 percent were recruited through the employment 
service. 
Outreach 
Government outreach efforts which lower the costs of participation, should have major 
effects on TJTC use. The analysis of the first wave of the employer survey found that 
firms learning of the Welfare Work Incentive (WIN) program through personal contact 
by a representative of a government agency or local business organization were 84 
percent more likely to participate in WIN during 1979, and 63 percent more likely to 
participate in TJTC, than firms that had first heard about the program from other sources 
[Bishop and Montgomery, 1986]. Having first heard of Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act on-the-job training (CETA-OJT) from a personal contact more than doubled 
the chances of participating in CETA-OJT during 1979. 
In the second wave of the survey, employers who had heard of TJTC were asked 
two questions about government-initiated contacts promoting the TJTC program. The 
first question was: "Have you or any of your staff spoken to a representative of 
government, a trade association, or a local business organization about these tax credits?" 
If so, they were asked who initiated the contact. Thirteen percent responded that a 
governmental official had initiated a conversation with them about TJTC. The second 
question was, "Have you been asked by the employment service or any other agencies to 
accept referrals of job applicants who are eligible for Targeted Job Tax Credits or Work 
Incentive tax credits?" Twenty-one percent responded that they had received such a 
request. Approximately 10 percent reported both types of interactions. 
The coefficients reported in Table 1 measure the expected proportionate increase 
in certification of TJTC-eligibles induced by each type of government-initiated contact. 
Contacts with an employer that include an offer to refer TJTC-eligible job candidates to 
the firm had a much larger impact on TJTC certifications than conversations that 
promoted the program but did not offer a referral. The coefficient on the indicator 
variable indicating that the government offered to refer an eligible is 2.467. This implies 
that making such an offer increases the expected number of TJTC certifications at that 
establishment by a factor of 12. In the next two years the coefficients are positive and 
highly significant; the point estimates in 1981 and 1982 are 1.58 and 2.201, respectively. 
Previous Receipt of Other Subsidies 
As hypothesized, participation in similar subsidy programs prior to 1980 had a large 
statistically significant impact on TJTC certifications. The effects of participation prior to 
1979 did not diminish with time; they were even larger in 1982 than they were in 1980. 
Firms that participated in all three of the programs prior to 1980 certified ten times as 
many TJTC eligibles as firms that had participated in none. These effects are partly a 
result of learning and partly a consequence of unobserved differences across firms in 
their propensity to participate in subsidy programs. 
EVIDENCE OF THE EXTENT OF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION 
We now turn to the effects of nonpecuniary participation costs on the effectiveness of the 
program. As Moffitt [1983] points out, the effects of participation costs on the labor 
supply of welfare recipients-or, in this case, the hiring of disadvantaged workers by 
firms-depends on whether these costs are primarily fixed or variable. From the 
perspective of the Moffitt model, what have been called fixed costs of active participation 
(Ca) are really variable costs that experience a discrete jump when the firm chooses 
consciously to increase its hiring of eligibles. The fixed costs of passive participation 
(e.g., the costs of learning enough about the program to use it, establishing a system to 
identify which new hires are eligible, and risking greater scrutiny from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission or the Internal Revenue Service) discourage 
participation; but for those who do participate, such costs should have no systematic 
effect on the impact of the subsidy on employment. Consequently, cost-effectiveness is 
not diminished. Employer characteristics associated with low fixed costs-membership in 
business organizations, a personnel officer, and previous use of the program-had great 
effects on participation. But these variables could be proxying for the fixed and variable 
costs of active participation as well, so this fact should not be interpreted as favorable 
news about cost-effectiveness. 
The variable costs of participation are the costs of making arrangements for the 
referral of eligible workers and of identifying and certifying eligible workers, and the risk 
of hiring workers who are less productive than the typical unsubsidized new hire. These 
costs lower the net benefit of hiring additional subsidized workers and, therefore, increase 
the chances the firm will only passively participate in the program or reduce its response 
when it is an active participant. Since some windfall payments are inevitable, any-thing 
that reduces the behavioral response tends to reduce cost-effectiveness as well. The 
foregoing analysis provides evidence that the incremental costs of participation are quite 
high for many firms. Various indicators of these costs-training costs, unionization, the 
cost of machinery and willingness to fire, past use of the employment service, and 
contacts by the employment service offering to refer eligibles - had significant effects on 
participation. 
This evidence that the costs of active participation are high suggests that the 
predominant form of participation in TJTC may be passive. However, the evidence is by 
no means definitive. Better evidence on the issue comes from studying the administrative 
mechanisms that firms have established to participate in TJTC. The mechanism that now 
produces the great majority of certifications is as follows: Employers who believe that 
some of their new hires are eligible send a letter td the employment service requesting 
certification for each new hire. This letter must be sent before the new hire begins work, 
but the determination of the worker's eligibility by the employment service may occur 
many weeks later. Sometimes employers make such requests for every-one they hire. In 
most cases, however, the new hires are screened for eligibility by the employer or over 
the phone by an outside contractor. This screening generally occurs after the hiring 
decision is made. The evidence that screening comes after hiring comes from two 
surveys. During the summer of 1985, staff of the National Center for Research in 
Vocational Education interviewed corporate, regional, and local managers of 35 large 
multi-establishment firms in industries that are heavy users of TJTC, accounting for 
about 15 percent of all TJTC certifications. Those interviews revealed that screening 
takes place after the hiring decision in 5 of the 8 fast food chains, 5 of the 7 hotel chains, 
and 17 of the 20 other firms studied [Hollenbeck, 1985]. 
In many states, consulting firms handle the screening and certification paperwork 
for more than half of the TJTC certifications. During March 1986 a second series of 
telephone interviews was conducted with 13 outside con-tractors that did TJTC screening 
and paperwork for the original sample of 35 firms. Ten of these contractors reported that 
more than 95 percent of their clients screen for TJTC eligibility after rather than before 
the hiring decision. One consulting firm thought a significant number of its clients were 
prescreening, but could not estimate how many. Another routinely encouraged its clients 
to screen prior to making selections and thought that three-quarters were doing so. The 
third firm had developed a proprietary screening procedure that was apparently 
administered by the firm prior to the hiring decision. Most of these consulting firms are 
apparently marketing systems that greatly simplify passive participation but fail to 
stimulate the active forms of participation sought by the program designers. 
The final bit of evidence on the issue comes from the 1982 survey. Employers 
who knew or thought they were hiring TJTC-eligibles were asked directly, "How much 
did this possibility of eligibility increase the applicants chances of being hired?" Only 18 
percent reported they were influenced "a great amount" and only 15 percent reported 
being influenced a moderate amount. "Not very" was selected by 23 percent, and "not at 
all" by 46 percent. In summary, the evidence clearly indicates that the predominant mode 
of participation in TJTC is passive, and therefore that the windfall element of the 
program is probably quite large. 
THE STIGMA PROBLEM 
One of the most important determinants of TJTC use is employer beliefs about the 
productivity of individuals who are eligible for subsidy. The survey asked all employers 
who had heard of TJTC if they thought "that tax-credit-eligible people usually make 
better or poorer new employees than people who are not tax-credit eligible." Despite the 
fact that the socially acceptable response is clearly "don't know," "no difference," or 
"better," 28 percent of our respondents admitted to believing that TJTC-eligibles were 
poorer workers than average; only 7 percent said they made better workers. A stigma 
index was constructed, assigning + 1 for employers who thought eligibles made better-
than-average workers, 0 for those who thought it made no difference, and -1 for those 
who thought eligibles made poorer workers. For nonparticipating firms that answered the 
question, the un-weighted mean of this stigma index was -.46.2 The views of 
participating employers were less negative. Their unweighted mean on the stigma index 
was -.17. Weighting the participants by the number of subsidized hires significantly 
2
 Employers who had not participated in the program typically did not know which of their current 
employees are eligible for TJTC, and may not even have known what makes a person eligible. Their 
opinions may reflect prejudice more often than actual experience. Although the employers who participated 
in the program typically had a chance to observe directly how well particular TJTC-eligible employees did, 
subjective productivity measures are not very reliable, so their opinion is probably some mixture of 
previous prejudices and recent experiences. 
raised the average opinion of TJTC-eligibles. When weighted by usage of TJTC, the 
mean of the stigma index was roughly zero (-.05 and .04, depending on whether before-
ERTA or after-ERTA use of TJTC serves as the weighting factor). There is a strong 
negative correlation between stigmatizing beliefs about eligibles and employer use of 
TJTC. No doubt these beliefs influence participation. But does participation also 
influence these beliefs? Let us now turn to this question. 
Is TJTC Reducing Stigma? 
Since most employers do not know when they have hired someone on welfare or from a 
disadvantaged background, they have no empirical basis on which to reevaluate their 
prejudices about these workers, and so the prejudice is perpetuated. However, when a 
firm receives a tax credit for hiring a TJTC-eligible, it learns which of its employees are 
in TJTC target groups. As a result it gains an empirical basis for revising its opinions 
about target group members. When employers were asked to compare a specific TJTC-
eligible they hired to others hired for the same job, the TJTC-eligibles were reported to be 
just as productive and often more so. This suggests that among those who use the 
program, prejudices against TJTC-eligibles should diminish over time. While repeated 
measures of prejudice are not available to test this hypothesis, we do have repeated 
measures of TJTC use. The 1982 employer survey also contains data on the success of a 
TJTC-eligible who was hired in 1980 or early 1981. The impact that success (or lack of 
success) with a previous TJTC-eligible has on later use of the program can therefore be 
examined. 
This was done by reestimating the models in Table 1 with additional variables 
representing past use of TJTC and the success of past use of subsidy programs. The 
model predicting TJTC certification after September 1981 contains three additional 
variables: an indicator variable for TJTC participation in 1980, an indicator variable for 
TJTC participation in the first nine months of 1981, and a continuous variable measuring 
the relative productivity of a subsidized worker who was hired in 1980 or the first nine 
months of 1981. The model predicting TJTC hiring between December and September 
1981 contains two additional variables: an indicator variable for TJTC participation in 
1980, and a continuous variable measuring the relative productivity of a TJTC-eligible 
hired in 1980 or the first three months of 1981. 
The coefficients on the reestimated models are presented in Table 2. Not 
surprisingly, participation in TJTC at one point in time is associated with greater TJTC 
hiring in later time periods. Having participated in 1980 quadrupled TJTC certifications 
in 1981 and doubled it in 1982. Certifying one or more TJTC-eligibles in the first nine 
months of 1981 multiplies expected TJTC certifications after September 1981 by six. The 
coefficients on favorable past experience are positive as hypothesized and, in 1982 are 
statistically significant. The coefficient implies a modest response to TJTC use to 
successful past experience with a subsidized employee.3 Bishop [1985] found that TJTC-
3
 The relative productivity of the subsidized employee is the difference in reported productivity during the 
third through twelfth week between a specific randomly selected subsidized new hire and the typical new 
hire for that job. The scale on which productivity was reported ranged from zero for absolutely no 
productivity to 100 for the highest productivity ever achieved by a worker in the same job. CETA/JTPA-
eligibles in the retail and service sector were reported by their supervisor to be an average 
of 9 percent more productive in the third through twelfth week than unsubsidized workers 
doing the same job. A 9 percent productivity advantage by an early TJTC hire is 
predicted by the equation to increase TJTC hiring by 29 percent in 1981 and 18 percent in 
1982. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In fiscal year 1985 the ratio of TJTC-certified new hires to total private sector 
employment was only about 0.7 percent, while unemployment was averaging 7 percent. 
Since many more people are unemployed at some point during the year than are 
unemployed at a particular point in time, it is clear that, relative to the problem it is 
addressing, TJTC is of quite modest scale. At such a scale, the program clearly cannot 
end welfare dependency and structural unemployment. Limitations on eligibility and 
small budgets do not account for the program's modest scale, for it is an entitlement and 
the pool of potential eligibles is quite large. The low rates of participation in TJTC by 
firms that hire unskilled workers appear to be a consequence of the high nonpecuniary 
costs of participation. Models predicting which establishments choose to participate in 
TJTC offer considerable support for this view. The primary source of the high 
participation costs appears to be the complicated eligibility rules, which make it difficult 
to identify and to recruit eligible disadvantaged workers, and the stigma attached to being 
a member of TJTC's target groups. 
These problems are not easily solved, because they are inherent in a targeted 
employment subsidy. The very rationale of the program involves targeting hard-to-
employ workers. Targeting, however, means that eligibility certification must be done by 
government agencies, and that employers are likely to perceive those eligible for subsidy 
as less productive than other job applicants. Both factors reduce participation. If less 
stigmatizing criteria were used to define target groups, eligibility would have to be 
broadened and the program's cost-effectiveness would be reduced. 
The nonpecuniary cost of active participation-consciously trying to recruit and 
hire additional disadvantaged workers-appears to be particularly high. This suggests that 
much of the participation that does occur is probably passive and thus does not contribute 
to the social goal of increasing job opportunities for the disadvantaged. Stigma is clearly 
an important reason why employers perceive the costs of active participation to be so 
high. Most employers say they have no plans to ask the employment service for referrals 
of TJTC-eligibles when they "need to hire unskilled workers" in the future. When asked 
to explain why, employers cited the anticipated low quality or inappropriate skills of the 
people they expected would be referred. Together with the fact that the great majority of 
employers report that they screen for TJTC eligibility after making the hiring selection, 
OJT workers were included among the subsidized workers because it was thought that positive (or 
negative) experiences with either program would color opinions of the other program. The mean of the 
productivity variable is 67. If we randomly select two of a firm's new hires for a particular position, the 
typical magnitude of the difference between the productivity of these two workers is 15 points. The 
favorable past experience variable is based on the experience with only one of possibly many TJTC hires, it 
is probably measured with a good deal of error. This should bias coefficients toward zero, so the long-run 
impact of making successful placements of disadvantaged workers on future willingness to participate in 
TJTC is probably greater than that suggested by the results just reported. 
Table 2. Determinants of participation and impact of outreach and previous use 
(Number of observations = 2,621). 
Variables 1980 
Indicators of the number of eligibles 
Log estab. empl 
in 1980 
New hire rate in 
1979 IV 
Proportion under 25 
in 1978 
Proportion unskilled 
in 1979 
0.761c 
1.101c 
-0 .125 
0.266b 
(26.9) 
(3.10) 
(.65) 
(2.17) 
Indicators of incremental participation cost 
Log index of general 
training 
Log index of specific 
training 
Unionized 
Proportion part-time 
Log cost of machine 
Wage residual 
Someone fired in 1979 
Layoff based on 
seniority 
Indicators of fixed cost 
Log firm/estab. 
employment 
Has personnel office 
Member of 
local business 
organization 
Listed opening with 
employment service 
in 1979 
Outreach 
Government offer of 
eligibility referral 
Conversation about 
TJTC not initiated 
by firm 
Both a conversation 
and a referral offer 
0.280c 
-0 .130 a 
- 0 . 2 7 1 b 
-0.237 
-0 .075 c 
-0 .347 c 
0.144a 
0.111 
- 0 . 0 7 1 b 
-0 .120 
0.310c 
-0 .503 c 
2.467c 
0.626c 
-0 .937 c 
Previous receipt of subsidies 
New jobs tax credit 
WIN in 1977,78, 
or 79 
CETA-OJT in 78 or 79 
Participated in 
TJTC in 1980 
Participated in 
TJTC in 1981 
Favorable past 
experience (TJTC 
was better (+) or 
worse ( - ) than 
average) 
0.376c 
0.122 
0.614c 
(7.49) 
(1.79) 
(2.37) 
(1.28) 
(3.86) 
(3.57) 
(1.83) 
(.98) 
(2.08) 
(1.43) 
(4.17) 
(6.92) 
(20.9) 
(3.74) 
(5.18) 
(4.31) 
(1.04) 
(6.23) 
1981 
0.792c 
3.525c 
0.937c 
-0 .204 a 
0.186c 
-0.342 c 
0.466c 
-0.509 c 
-0 .093 c 
0.254c 
0.242c 
0.112 
0.011 
0.140a 
-0.061 
-0.297 c 
1.646c 
0.444c 
-1.400 c 
0.093 
-0 .188 a 
0.757b 
1.307c 
0.042 
(29.9) 
(12.4) 
(5.86) 
(1.81) 
(5.36) 
(5.40) 
(4.49) 
(3.07) 
(4.87) 
(2.61) 
(3.15) 
(1.02) 
(.41) 
(1.68) 
(.92) 
(4.32) 
(18.9) 
(3.77) 
(9.94) 
(1.09) 
(1.73) 
(8.77) 
(18.3) 
(1.49) 
1982 
0.283c 
3.105c 
0.330 
1.608c 
-0.174 c 
-0.012 
-0.806 c 
0.362 
0.230c 
0.387c 
-0.594 c 
0.331b 
0.254c 
0.106 
0.260c 
0.475c 
1.914c 
0.167 
-1.160 c 
0.946c 
0.070 
0.981c 
0.829c 
1.777c 
0.028c 
(7.92) 
(9.20) 
(1.56) 
(9.74) 
(3.40) 
(.14) 
(4.62) 
(2.02) 
(8.41) 
(2.70) 
(5.34) 
(2.20) 
(7.70) 
(.82) 
(2.73) 
(4.47) 
(14.8) 
(.87) 
(5.22) 
(8.67) 
(.48) 
(7.75) 
(7.15) 
(14.0) 
(2.85) 
t-value in parenthesis. 
a
 Significant at the 10% level (two sided). 
b
 Significant at the 5% level (two sided). 
c
 Significant at the 1% level (two sided). 
these findings suggest that windfalls are substantial and that unless costs per certified 
worker are extremely low, TJTC is not very cost effective. 
Does the program do better from a more dynamic perspective? If, as we 
speculated earlier, TJTC is inducing employers to upgrade their opinions of the 
productivity of workers from targeted groups, the great cost of the pro-gram could be 
justified. No direct tests of this hypothesis were feasible in our data, but an indirect test-
whether positive experience with a subsidized worker increases future use of TJTC-did 
yield results consistent with the hypothesis. More evidence is needed on this issue. 
Despite this possibility, it would appear desirable to reform TJTC to reduce 
windfalls and increase cost-effectiveness. One simple but effective reform would be to 
make TJTC a marginal tax credit. To receive a tax credit in 1991, a firm would have to 
exceed the number of certifications it obtained in 1990, and only the excess of claims 
made in 1991 over claims made in 1990 would generate a tax credit. The cost of the 
program would decline, but the incentive to increase TJTC hiring would remain. The 
1989 tax credit claims would also serve as the threshold in later years. It should not be 
updated yearly to reflect the firm's most recent use of the program, because an updating 
rule substantially reduces incentive effects and invites strategic behavior that consciously 
lowers the hiring of targeted labor in one year to enhance subsidy eligibility in later years 
[Bishop and Wilson, 1982]. 
Another and probably preferable alternative would be to drop the employer 
subsidy approach altogether and subsidize instead the wages of unemployed, 
disadvantaged individuals who find and keep a job [Lerman, 1982]. The employer would 
not know which (if any) employees were being subsidized, so the stigma would not affect 
employer response to the program. Two randomized experiments using this approach 
have found that offering job seekers a very modest reward for finding and keeping a job 
has substantial short- and medium-term effects on employment and earnings [Rivera-
Casale, Friedman, and Lerman, 1982; Spiegelman and Woodbury, 1987]. There is no 
subsidy scheme that does not generate windfalls for someone. Probably the most 
important difference between a wage supplement and an employment subsidy is who 
receives the windfalls. In an employment subsidy, the employers of low-wage workers 
receive the windfalls; in a wage rate supplement, low-wage disadvantaged workers 
receive them. They get nothing if they do not work. The windfall arises when individuals 
who would have worked in any case, without the wage supplement, get higher take-home 
pay as a result of the supplement. 
On the more general issue of policy analysis, our conclusion is that the magnitude 
and structure of participation costs are critical to both the scale and effectiveness of tax 
subsidies and grant programs designed to change the behavior of firms and individuals. A 
policy analysis involving a simulation of response based on standard income and 
substitution parameters of production and utility theory can be very misleading. Policy 
analysis needs to incorporate the administrative and information costs (those costs 
involved in running and participating in the program) into the models used to simulate the 
cost and impact of tax subsidies and grant programs. 
APPENDIX: THE POISSON SPECIFICATION 
The first derivative of the likelihood is given by 
N 
əL / əB = Σ (- Xi exp(XiB) + NiXi), 
and the Hessian is 
N 
ə
2L/əBə’ = - Σ x iX’ i exp (XiB). 
The log likelihood is globally concave in B and so standard nonlinear maximization 
routines yield the MLE of B. Under the Poisson specification, the expected value of the 
variance is given by mi. Therefore, a unit increase in the explanatory variable will 
influence both the expected values and the variance of the outcomes. So bj represents 
relative increase in the mean and the variance of the outcome in response to the unit 
change in the right hand side variable Xij. 
Another measure of the impact of the change in firm characteristics is the change 
in the probability of participation. In particular, since 90 percent of the firms do not hire 
any TJTC workers, it is useful to obtain the change in the probability of hiring TJTC-
eligibles. The change in probability is obtained by differentiating the probability of not 
hiring any TJTC worker (Pr(0)) by X and then taking its negative value. The formula is 
given by the following: 
əPr (Participation) = Pr(0)mibj = ΔPibj 
əXij 
where ΔPi = Pr(0) mi = mi/exp(mi) 
Since ΔPi is a function of mi only, for each value of the probability of no participation, 
the corresponding value of ΔPi can be obtained. The next table shows the values of ΔPi 
corresponding to various levels of Pr(0): 
Pr (no participation) ΔPi 
0.95 
0.90 
0.80 
0.70 
0.60 
0.50 
0.049 
0.095 
0.179 
0.250 
0.306 
0.347 
The marginal effect of the
 jth characteristic on the probability of participation is obtained 
by multiplying ΔPi by bi. 
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